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BLACK-ROBED
JUSTICE
IN NEW MEXICO, 1846-1912
.
.
, By ARIE POLDERVAART
CHAPTER

XV

COMBING POLITICAL HAIR

Elisha V. Long, who was serving as judge of the circuit
court of Whitney county at Warsaw, Indiana, though not an
applicant for. the office, was selected by President Grover
Clevelana to fill the vacancy occasioned by removal of Chief
Justice Vincent.
As a member of the bar of Indiana before coming to
New Mexico, Judge Long occupied a number of positions of
honor and trust. In 1863 he was appointed district attorney
for Kosciusko and Wabash counties, holding the office for
three years. Governor Thomas A. Hendricks, afterward a
vice president of the United States, in 1872 named Judge
Long to the circuit bench of Indiana presiding over the judicial area comprising Kosciusko, Marshall and Fulton
counties, with a later addition of Whitley county. After completing this term by appointment he was t~ice re-elected,
presiding for thirteen years in all. Though Long was. a
Democrat in politics, his personal popularity and judicial
distinction were so pronounced that he twice 'carried Kosciuskocounty and the city of· Warsaw by large majorities
when the district was overwhelmingly Republican.
In R. E. Twitchell's opinion Judge Long's court was in
all probability the strongest, intellectually, which ever sat
on the Territorial bench in New Mexico. 1 Serving with
Judge Long were Associate Justice Reuben A. Reeves of
Texas, Associate Justice William H. Brinker from Missouri
and William F. Henderson from the State of Arkansas.
Early in 1887 Congress authorized division of the Territory of New Mexi~.o into four judicial districts, placing
upon-tlie-Territorial cliiel justice and tile -associate -justices
I

1.

Leading fact. of New Mexican history. II. 497-498.

40

41
the responsibility for carving the three districts of the Territory into four. Under the new plan, the rtewly appointed additional judge, Reuben A. Reeves, was assigned. to the first
judicial district with headquarters at Santa Fe, thus breaking the long established precedent of having the chief justice
head the first judicial district and reside in the capital. Chief
Justice Long took over the newly created fourth judicial
district with his headquarters at Las Vegas, where- he continued to reside until his death.
Legal questions coming before the Supreme Court had
increased manifold for several years and the variety of cases
was quite phenomenal. The.' Santa Fe New Mexican editor'
ialized on this subject, saying:
COMBING POLITICAL HAIR

In view of the limited population of New Mexico and th'e undeveloped state of our natural resources it is a surprising fact that our
Supreme Court halil to consider every term questions whose legal importance and whose magnitude, in reference to the pecuniary and"
proprietary interests involved, are at least· equal to those which are
involved in the litigation of the wealthiest and most populous states
of the Union. 2

The district court dockets had been similarly <;rowded.
In 1886, for instance, while he was still presiding over the
first judicial district, Judge Long held court eleven months,
,resulting of necessity in serious delay in the decision of cases
appealed to the Supreme Court. This alarming situation was
partially alleviated through creation of the fourth district.
AI~ost immediately after his arrival in New Mexico,
Judge Long was faced with important political questions at
solution of which he became exceptionally "adept. ,Democratic Governor Ross upon taking office proceeded to remove
all the Republican officials, but Attorney General Breeden
and sorpe· other Republican officials refused to submit without a legal battle.
In January, 1886, the already familiar question of who
was attorney general of New Mexico arose again, this time
, between Colonel Breeden and N. B. Laughlin, the latter a
member of the Supreme Court some years later. Colonel
2.

Dee. 16. 1887.
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Breeden started to represent the Territory in the case of
Territory of New Mexico v. Kinney,3 when he was interrupted by Mr. Laughlin, who proceeded to address the court
and claimed that he was the attorney general and not Colonel
Breeden.! In support of his claim he produced a commission,
regular upon its face, signed by Governor Ross and dated
November 15, 1885. Colonel Breeden thereupon presented
his commission, also regular and formal, signed. by Gov..
Lionel A. Sheldon in April, 1884.
Judge Long himself wrote a separate opinion which settled the dispute in a collateral way, pointing out that the
question really was not before the court as an issue legally
joined since it came up in the course of another controversy
properly before it'.4 Hence, said Judge Long, the court would
, determine the matter informally so it might proceed with
the principal case, using such facts only as were then apparent and without determining finally who was the real
attorney general of New Mexico.
The governor had sought to remove Colonel Breeden
and had publicized his decision to do so. Since an act of
congress, however, declared that the governor could appoint
a new attorney general either upon death of the incumbent
or upon his resignation and since Colonel Breeden appeared
in person very much alive and showing no disposition whatsoever of having resigned his position, the court concluded
that the political appointment of his alleged successor could
not have been predicated upon either of those contingencies.
On the other hand, the governor had openly announced
through the press and otherwise, that he was removing
Colonel Breeden and substituting Mr. Laughlin. The court
concluded that it could take judicial notice of these facts as
being current history of the Territory. It thereupon decided
that in accordance with the earlier decision in Territory v.
Stokes, 2 N. M. 63, Colonel Breeden's term not having expired by limitation, it would recognize his right to proceed
with prosecution of the Kinney case as the de facto 5 attorney
3.

4.

3 N. M~-(Gild;)-656;-9-Pac:-599; .
See In re Claim for Recognition as Attorney General, 3 N. M. (Gild.) 524,

9 Pac. 249.
5. In fact, but without lawful title.

;'
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general. The court thus side-stepped a forthright clash with
the gov'ernor on the question of the chief executive's power
of removal of the Territorial officer.
Exactly one year later, however, the same legal question came up in another political appointment wrangle. And
in this case the issue was placed squarely before the court.
Judge Long again wrote the opinion.
'
In this case Edward C. Wade had been duly appo~nted
and confirmed as district attorney of the third judicial district on March '11, 1884. According to Mr. Wade's contention, on November 9, 1885, Singleton M. Ashenfelter came
along with an illegal claim to the office, based upon a gubernatorial commission. Wade contended the commission was
void because, although it had been made by the governor,
the appointment had not been approved by the legislative
council. Since that ill-fated day in November, Wade declared, Ashenfelter had actually excluded him (Wade) from
the office. The district court listened to Wade's story and
agreeing with him, adjudged him to be the lawful incumbent.
Mr. Ashenfelter predicated his right to the office upon
a commission issued him on October 28, 1885, by Governor
Ross. The council had not been in session since that date
and hence had not had the opportunity either to confirm or
to reject the appointment. The questions presented to the
Sup!eme Court by this controversy were:
(1) Was there a vacancy when the governor made this appointment?
(2) If no vacancy existed, dId the governor have the power to
create one by the mere act of appointment and delivery, of a commission to Ashenfelter, and thus by the same act both create and fill
the vacancy?

The real question, according, to the Court's interpretation, resolved itself into whether the governor had the
power to r:emove from office one who had been appointed for
a fixed and definite term. In a lengthy summary and survey
of opinions by courts of other jurisdictions on the question,
Judge Long wrote that such power in the governor did not
exist. The opinion was based upon pure and convincing

44
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.principles offundamenhillaw, ,but it did not negate the fact
that the decision was the second in two years in direct op, position to the wishes of the executive. In what appears to
have been an attempt to' smooth over the governor's ruffled'
feelings as best he could, Judge Long declared, in an elo':
quent exposition of human rights:
In what has been said upon the law of this case, there has been
no wish or 'purpose to cast the least imputation on the motives of the
executive. The same presumption of good faith and honest desire to
act within legal and constitutional limits are accorded to, him as to
either of the coordinate branches of the government, and his motives
are not the subject of criticism. No doubt, he acted upon the impression that he was entirely within the line of his duty, as well as of law,
and that he believed the removal of the respondent was demanded by
the best interests of the public service.
- It is a very delicate task for one department o{ the government
to pass upon the acts of either of the others. It is, however, unavoidabl~, as the ,law ha~ imposed upon the judiciary duties it can not and
should not seek to escape, but rather· to discharge them with the highest res'pect for the other departments, and with the single purpose t~
maintain only those principles of law firmly established by the weight
of authority, well founded in justice, proper for the protection of
human rights, and the maintenance of that system which prevails, that
everyone, however humble, shall be heard before he is condemned or
his rights denied. 6

Because of his stand in upholding the law against his
own party, Judge Long was severely scored by party friends.
In the case of Territory v. Thornason,7 an interesting
language problem confronted the court, originating in a
criminal trial. After the trial had been concluded and while
the jury was in deliberation, it developed that about one
half of the jury couldn't speak a word of English, while the
other half couldn't speak or understand Spanish.. All possibility of deliberation or agreement was thus cut off. In
desperation the 'jury twice earnestly asked to be supplied
with some medium of communication. Finally an officer of
the court, specially provided by statute as an interpreter,
was first sworn and then sent into the jury ro()~. 'I'he!l~.-·
6.
7.

Territory v. Ashenfelter, 4 N. M. 93 (Columbia, Mo., 1896). PP. 147-148.
4 N. M. 154, 13 Pac. 223.
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fendant's attorneys' now contended that sending the interpreter in with the jury, when it was considering the verdict,
over the defendant's objection, was error. The law is extremely jealous, said the defe~dant, "of the slightest communication of any person, including even the judge, with
the jury after they have retired."
.
The question; as Chief Justice Long pointed out in writing the opinion in the case, was a novel one peculiar to New
Mexico, and one which had "not been before decided by any'
court," in so far as the court had been able to find in its
search. Hence, the judge held, this case stood on its own
peculiar facts. .
Deciding the· point upon general principles, the court
concluded that when the defendant relies upon an alleged
irregularity of the court or jury, the burden is upon him,
not only to show it, but also to prove he was prejudiced
thereby. The presumption is, said the court, that the interpreter was in the jury room
not to communicate to the jury, but only to act as the medium of
communication. He could not have been an embarrassment to the jury,
for that body twice earnestly asked for his presence. The interpreter
did not intrud.e himself upon the jury as a mere listener, but went by
direction of the court, on the request of the whole panel. This case is
not like one where, unbidden, a stranger goes into the jury room as
a spy upon the deliberations, or as an unwelcome intruder. Such a
person might be a restraint upon that free interchange of 'opinion so'
important to correct results. It is not in this case shown, or attempted
to be proven, that the interpreter said a word, or performed an act,
inimical or prejudicial to the prisoner, or that any juror was restrained in the exercise of his duty, or in the slightest influenced by
the presence of the interpreter. Acting under oath and the order of
the court, the presumption should be in favor of proper action by him,
rather than against it.... If this officer of the court did or said anything prejudicial, that is a fact for the defendant to show in the court
below in the first instance. 8
.

Chief Justice Long held several distinctions in his able
career upon the bench in New Mexico. Among these may be
included that of having prepared the longest and most exhaustive opinion written in any case during Territorial days.
8.

Territory 11. Thoma8on, 4 N. M. 154, at PP. 167-168.
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The controversy in question was that of the United States 'V.
the San Pedro and Canon del Agua Company, reported in
. volume 4 of the .New Mexico Supreme Court reports. The
'case begins on page 405 of the volume in the Gildersleeve
editlon and extends through page 602, but two pages short
of two hundred printed pages. The actual opinion of Chief
Justice Long extends from page 414 to page 577, and there
is an additional opinion on rehearing by Judge Long beginning on page 598 and continuing to page 602. In this case
the United States sought to set aside on grounds of alleged
fraud and imposition, a survey of public land which the defendant claimed he had derived through a grant from the
Mexican government that had been made prior to the cession
of New Mexico to the United States. The grant had been
approved by the surveyor general, and it had been confirmed
.
by act of congress.
In February, 1844, Jose Sefarin Ramirez had petitioned
the then governor of the department of New Mexico for a
certain tract of land described in his petition as over a
league distant from the town of Real de San Francisco. In
the case before the court it was averred that the north line
of the grant as confirmed by the surveyor general, through
the fraud and connivance of the original petitioner with the
surveyor general and others, had been extended so as to
include certain valuable copper mining properties. The bill
then seeks to set aside the survey and to va'cate the patent
made under it, so far as the alleged extensions are concerned,
on grounds of fraud and mistake. The court made a lengthy
study of the fact~ and concluded that Ramirez was thoroughly familiar with the original delineation and that if it had
not b~en correct he would certainly have complained and
sought a correction of the descriptions. Accordingly, the
subsequent delineation which extended the boundaries evidenced fraud because it in effect reversed the boundaries of
the grant.
------ -- -Afte~whatthe-co1,lrtsaidwas a caI'eful weighing and
, ~onsideration of the record in the case (which consisted of
over seven hundred closely printed pages, with numerous
I
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maps and plats -in addition!), it held that the fraud and
mistake alleged were clearly and satisfactorily proven. It
also pointed out that in any event, by the laws of Spain and
Mexico, mines would not be conveyed in such a grant since
they were reserved to the crown or the government.
Both in the Canon del Agua case in the Supreme Court
and in the Las Vegas Grant case in the district court, Judge
Long showed courage and legal knowledge. _As in the Attorney General case these decisions made him some influential and bitter enemies. Several years later when the Court
of Private Land Claims was about to 'be created, Judge Long
was considered as one of.th~ most likely persons to be considered for appointment to, that body. His adversaries,
however, slipped a proviso into the act stating that no resident of New Mexico or Arizona should be eligible as a judge
for such a court. Leaders in Territorial affairs for some
years had been active in promoting appointment of New
Mexico and Arizona residents for official positions within
/ these' Territories, and this sudden reversal of policy has
been generally interpreted as directed primarily at preventing Judge Long's appointment.
.
In 1890 the chief justice submitted his resignation and
entered private practice of law at Las Vegas, where he died
on September 9, 1928.
CHAPTER

XVI

AN IRISHMAN ADORNS THE BENCH

Dr. John B. Newbrough, Ohio born spiritualist, had a
vision while living in New York State which in 1881 impelled him to write a new Bible "by automatic control." He
called it the Oahspe and had it published early in 1883. Andrew M. Howland, a well-to-do wool dealer in Boston saw a
copy of the new book ina bookshop and became interested in
the movement which it outlined, the founding and maintenance of a home for orphans and castaway babies.
Howland, in October, 1883, went to a meeting which
Newbroughcalled in the interests of his new movement, and

, I,
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thenceforth helped it along financially. Newbrough's plan
"differed" from other orphan homes 'in, that the children
would be reared under a strictly religious program from
the cradle amidst teachings of cooperation, brotherly love
and helpfulness.
'
Down in Atlanta, Georgia, Jesse N. Ellis,\the father of
two young boys, also learned of the new movement through
some of its literature. He was particularly impressed with
communal features of the program, a "Utopian scheme for
the amelioration of all the ills, both temporal and spiritual,
to which human flesh and soul are heir." 1 According to
Ellis' understanding of the plan, "as outlined in the official
literature, the property of the community which the "Faith-'
ists" would establish in some remote and isolated spot was
to be held in common ; no one individual was to have any
separate title or property; the community would be conducted on principles of ,brotherly love, without master or
mortal leader there to exercise control over the others; all
members were to enjoy equally a permanent place in the
society. This, Ellis decided, was the ideal life. He had gone
bankrupt only a few years before and knew what it was to
be left without any security in a cruel and merciless world.
He, therefore, wrote Newbrough that he was ready to join
the community and to consecrate his life, his labor and his
worldly effects and prospects, together with those of his
two sons, to the good of the program. He joined the group
in July, 1884, at Pearl River, N~w York, sqme twenty-five
miles from New York City, where the Faithists were "mustering in" to start their new adventure.
In Oahspe Newbrough had envisioned the type of location needed for the new Faithist colony and went West to
find a permanent site for the movement. Through' Arizona
he looked, then in California, finally in New Mexico. Convinced that he had been guided in his choice by "Jehovih"
from on high, Dr. Newbrough located his new Arcadia on
the river Shalam 1--'----(Rio Grande),
50 miles above EI1Paso,
in
__ .:.--- - ---the county of Dona Ana, in the valley of the Mesilla., He
-----------.-----~--,-----------.

1.

Ellis

11.

Newbrough, 6 N, M. 181, at

p.

184.

49
christened this'new Vale of Tempe,as the "Land of Shalam."
Friction developed among the members and Ellis was ordered to leave the colony. He decided to seek $10,000
compensation for alleged losses. in a district court jury
trial, he was awarded the sum of $1,500. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The opinion, handed down on
August 19, 1891, stands today as a leading case on the legal
doctrine of estoppel. Ellis was estopped by his own acts, the.
court said. It further held that there was no evidence to
sustain the verdict of the jury awarding the plaintiff $1,500;
that the refusal of the trial judge to set aside the verdict
.,was all wrong;' and that the judgment of the district court
would have to be reversed. 2
The opinion in the case was written by Judge Alfred
A. Freeman and is probably the best mixture of facetious
humor and satire e'ver penned by' a member of New Mexico's
highest tribunal.
It very nearly lost him his place upon the court.Presi'dent Harrison was deeply disturbed by what he regarded as
conduct improper and inconsistent with the dignity of the.
bench.
Serving as chief justice of the Supreme Court during
this time, from 1890 to 1893, was an Irish-born jurist -by
the name of James O'Brien, named to the post, while practicing law in Minnesota, by President Benjamin Harrison.
Judge O'Brien found a crowded docket upon his arrival In
New Mexico and in the three years on the bench he person·
ally wrote twenty majority opinions and also prepared dis·
senting views in five cases, in addition to presiding as judge
of the fourth judicial district with headquarters at Las
Vegas.
Throughout Territorial days controversies involving
water rights turned up in the courts from time to time with
curious twists. An interesting question of this nature was
decided .by the Supreme Court in July, 1891, a few weeks
before the decision in Ellis v. Newbrough, in an opinion
written by Chief ustice O'Brien. 3
AN IRISHMAN ADORNS THE BENCH

.r

2. EUis v. Newbrough, 6 N. M. 181, 27 Pac. 490.
3. Trombl<ltl v. Luterman. 6 N. M. 15, 27 Pac. 812.

\
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In May, 1846, Rafael Garcia, before justice -of the
peace Manuel, Duran, solicited permission to erect a mill on
an artificial race or ditch along the Gallinas river, near Las
'Vegas, explaining that erection of the mill would in no way
impede use of th'e water from the acequia for irrigation purposes. Consent was granted and in 1849 Garcia erected' a
grist mill, the machinery of which was propelled with the
water from the ditch, which in turn was supplied from the
river. A mill, such as the one Garcia built, is described by
Lt.'John G. Bourke as follows:
Cottonwood log edifices, about 12 ft. square and 7 ft. high, built
over the ditch to allow the water to turn a small turbine wheel. I
should conjecture that in an emergency, under the stimulus of a Gov't
contract, with a full complement of hands (that is to say a man smoking a cigarrito, a small boy scratching his nose, and a big dog scratching his ribs) and running full time, one of these mills could grind a
bushel of wheat in a week; the ordinary output can't be over half
that quantity.4

In 1859 Miguel Desmarais, Garcia's successor in interest, erected a new mill which he owned and worked until
October, 1864, when he conveyed to Juan Francisco Pinard,
who used it until May 10, 1867. Pinard sold out to Peter
and Ernestine Trambley and the latter operated the mill
until the summer of 1886 when George Luterman erected a
wool and pelt cleaning establishment along the ditch which
withdrew so much water that the Trambleys couldn't oper-,
ate their mill. They brought suit against Luterman to restrain him from diverting the water from the acequia.
The controversy was first brought before a Master who
concluded that the Trambleys were entitled to a restraining
order from the ~ourt against Luterman enjoining him from
using the water during the season of limited flow unless the
water so used was returned to the ditch above the Trambleys' mill, without serious diminution in quantity. Luterman appealed. In upholding the judgment of the fourth
judicial district court which had been based upon the Master's report, the Supreme Court, through Chief .Justice
O'Brien stated:
4.

NEW MEXICO HISTOIUCAL REVIEW, X, 299.

AN IRISHMAN ADORNS THE BENCH.

51

The ditch or acequia in controversy was made in the year 1846,
before the acquisition of the territory by the United States. The rights
of the parties to the use of the waters therein then attached according
to the laws, customs, and usages in force in the republic of Mexico.
It is apparent that when defendant bought his mill site in 1886 the
Trambleys personally, and by their predecessors through whom they
claimed title and took possession, had occupied and used the premises
continuously during forty years for substantially the same purposes
for which they were used when this suit was commenced; hence, when
defendant purchased he knew 01' might have known of the existence
of this servitude upon the land which he bought. 5

Anyone familiar with the final, congested hours of the
last days of a legislative session will readily understand
why some acts eventually reach the courts for disentanglement and interpretation. The courts, however, can do no
more than interpret the law as it is actually passed, giving
as much weight as possible to the true legislative intent.
When Chief Justice O'Brien was on the bench and former
Chief Justice Prince was governor of New Mexico a very
important law which had suffered a last minute legislative
.abortion came before the Supreme Court for final disposition.
The trouble arose from a provision in Chapter 94, Laws
of 189i, otherwise known as the Finance bilI, or appropriation act for the forty-second and forty-third fiscal years of
the Territor~al government. Section 1 provided funds and'
made all needed appropriations for the forty-second fiscal
year; section 2, by its terms, was intended to make provisions for the forty-third fiscal year. Charles W. Dudrow,
holder of an outstanding Territorial warrant, sought to convert the same into a Territorial six per centum interestbearing bond in conformity with a proviso in section 2 of
the'act.
Sections 1 and 2 occupy thirty-eight printed pages in
the 1891 session laws and each of these two sections is unusually complex, "surcharged with a strange variety of detailed items and multifarious provisions." The bill was
originally introduced in the Council and passed there, but
it was indefinitely postponed by the House which, on the
6.

Tramblell

lJ.

Luterman, 6 N. M. 16, at P. 23.
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eve of. final adjournment, passed a House substitute. The
Council rejected the House version and inste~d adopted .a
"Council Substitute for House Substitute for Council BIn
No. 81." On the last day of the session th'e Council appointed
a three-man committee to confer with a like group from the
House to consider the matter. The joint conference, after
persistent disagreements, finally recommended for passage
a version of the Council substitute, whereupon rules were
suspended and the bill passed. The conferees, however, had
barely time to rewrite section 1 of the bill, and, finding it
impossible before the hour of final adjournment to amend
in terms and rewrite section 2, they appended after secti~m
1, and directly ahead of section 2 which remained formally
unamended for want of time, the following note:
The amendments in Sec. 2 (for 43rd fiscal year) coincide with
those of preceding section throughout, and amounts and notes to be
changed to the same. 6

The provisions under which Dudrow tried to convert
appear in section 2 of the amended act but not in section 1;
hence, the court concluded that since these provisions are
not found in section 1, in effect they did not appear in section2, regardless of the fact that they did appear as part
of the printed section in the session laws. Said the court in
justifying its position: .
This court can not afford to be technical with the law-making
power of the territory. Our province is to interpret and obey the will,
not to criticise the modus operandi, or dictate the policy, of the legislature, created by the power of the general government. In justice to
the representatives of the people it must not be forgotten· that the
legislature was on the eve of a final adjournment when the bill passed.
The house had refused to pass the finance bill adopted by the council.
A final adjournment without such an enactment would be more than
a calamity-it ,:"ould be a public disaster. To prevent such a misfortune, haste and disregard of the usual formalities seemed imperative. Notwithstanding all this, it scarcely admits of doubt that the
legislature clearly expressed the intent, when it adopted the report of
the joint conierence committee, that ·section -2 of chapter 94 should
6:

LawB of New Mexico, 1891, Chap. 94, Sec. ,2, p. 207.
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contain the substantial provisions embraced in section 1, and that, all
provisions found in the former, not embraced in the latter, should be
expunged. 7
'

.' When the Constitution was drafted for the new State
of New Mexico nearly twenty years later, the possibility
of this type of confused legislation was averted by the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the amendment I of
legislation by reference. No doubt the recollection of the
difficulties caused by this act may have added to the determination of some of the convention members to avoid the
problem in statehood days.
A controversy connected with selecti<;m of the county
seat of San Juan county was one of the important issues
which came up for settlement during the time O'Brien was
chief justice.s According to provisions of Chapter 7, Laws of
1889, the legal voters of San Juan county were authorized
at the general election of 1890 to vote on Junction City, Aztec
and Farmington for their perma'nent county seat. The elec-'
tion was spirited and the board of county canvassers duly
declared Junction City as the county seat with a majority of
nine votes over Aztec, the next nearest competitor. In the
election contest which followed, evidence tended to show
that three non-citizens had voted for Junction City, some
one else who voted for Junction City had lived in the Territory only forty days; and enough others had voted for Junction City illegally and fraudulently to change the result.
Illegality of these latter votes was based on a charge of
bribery. Testimony indicated that up to two or three months
before the date of eleCtion there was no such place in existence as Junction City, nor was one contemplated. About
that time, a company was organized which purchased land
at the place, platted it as a city, and gave a large square for
county purposes. This company made a proposition to the
San Juan county voters that, if they would locate the county
seat at this place, where as yet no one resided and the lots
were not sold, it would bind itself to build the necessary
county buildings for the use of the county. To induce the
7.
8.

Territory ex reI. Dudrow v. Prince, 6 N. M. 635, at pp. 641-642.
Edward G. Berry, et al. v. Henry fiuU. et al., 6 N. M. 643, 30 Pac. 936.
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voters to have a personal interest in locating the county seat
at this place they began offering certificates to residents of
~he county to lots in the proposed town which upon their
face recited a price of only $1.00 per lot. This one dollar was
clearly nominal, intended probably to pay the cost of the
documents and, as the court phrased it, "so nominal as to
cast suspicion upon the whole transaction." There was no
outright evidence that the company actually campaigned,
asking people to vote for Junction City, but conversation
about voting for Junction City as county seat was constantly
in the air, concluded the court, while these certificates were'
being issued. Furthermore, it was notable that the certificates were not good after the first of January following the
election in November. Nothing was paid at the time the
script was given, and the dollar was paid only upon delivery
of the deed, if the certificate was presented before January 1.
Aztec, of course, heard what was taking place so it too
offered some one dollar lots.
The Supreme Court made a careful survey of the facts
when the case came up before it and concluded that from
the two-hundred and fifty-five votes cast for Junction City,
twenty-three should be deducted as illegal, leaving as legal
votes cast in favor of Junction City, 232; from the 246 votes
cast for Aztec, nine were found to be illegal ballots, leaving
as legal votes cast for Aztec, 237. As a result, Aztec was
given- the county seat over Junction City by a majority of
five votes.
Antonio Cortesy had been fined for selling liquor on
the Sabbath. He appealed to the Supreme Court to determine
whether New Mexico had any valid law against selling
goods, wares, and merchandise, including liquor, on Sunday.
The question was one which involved interpretation of legislative intent in amending one Sunday statute by another
which, to make it more definite and certain, left out some of
the phraseology of the earlier act, and reduced penalties to
make the law more readily enforceable. In holding that sale
,of liquor on Sunday was a violation of the law, Justice Seeds,
writing the opinion, concluded:

.'
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As a Christian nation, it has always been the policy of the legislature to protect the sanctity of the S'abbath; to pass appropriate laws
for the proper observance of the Sabbath; and, unless the law is so
specific as to demand a construction against such view, it would be a
rash court that would give its adhesion to such a construction. It must
also be considered in this connection that the whole trend of modern
thought, feeling and legislation is toward the curtailing of the admitted evils of the liquor traffic.... 9

Justice Lee and Justice McFie concurred in this majority view, but Chief Justice O'Brien found himself unable
to agree and stated in his dissent:
Notwithstanding the foregoing vigorous argument of, the court,
redolent with the fervent eloquence of my Brother Seeds, I reluctantly
dissent from the conclusion reached. What induced the twenty-seventh
session of the legislative assembly of New Mexico to remove the safeguards thrown around the Christian Sabbath by a preexisting law of
the territory, is not the question submitted. Has it done so, is the only
point the court is called upon to determine in this case. lO

The word "labor," Judge O'Brien declared further, meant
"nothing more or less than manual, servile labor," and that
it would be "sheer nonsense to call a saloonkeeper or merchant a laborer or laboring man."
Judge O'Brien's court needed to discipline a 'leading
member of the bar for disrespect to the court when he prepared, his brief on appeal in the case qf Tomlinson v.
Territory. Explained the court:
The brief for appellant in this cause contains such an unwarranted attack upon the trial judge, his conduct, rulings, and instructions, as to amount to a scandalous and impertinent attack upon the
judiciary of the territory and of this court, of which the nisi' prius
judge is a member, which would warrant us of our own motion in
striking the brief and argument from the files, and affirming the decision without fur,ther investigation. It is proper for defendant to show'
errors, and apply the law to the same; but to allow an attorney to
'come into this court, and criticise and question, comment upon, and
condemn the motives which actuated the judge in his rulings below,
would be to place the defendant above the law, and to subject the
courts of this territory to wild tirades of abuse from any person of
9. Cortesy v. Territory, 6 N. M. 682, at p. 695.
10. Ibid., at page 697.
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malignant or depraved mind-would be lowering the dignity of the
bench, and subversive of good government. l l

Chief Justice O'Brien and Mr. Justice Lee concurred
with a separate statement, saying; "We concur . . . on account of the unwarranted attack upon the official conduct of
the trial judge in appellant's printed brief." The attorney,
who had thus invoked the displeasure of the court was Frank
W. Clancy. He sought a rehearing in the case on the ground
that misconduct of counsel, no matter how gross, should not
be visited upon the client, unless that client actively par,ticipated. In apologizing for his transgression, Mr. Clancy
said:
If, in my earnest effort to do my whole duty to a client who has
intrusted his case to me, I have exceeded the bounds of legitimate and
proper criticism of the trial court, I have done so unc~msciously. In'
view of the severe opinion of the court, and in view of the respect
which every member of the bar ought always to exhibit toward the
courts before which he appears, I desire to e'xpress my regret that
any act of mine could have called forth from any court such condemnation, and to say, although guiltless of any intentional offense,
that anything which even appears to the court improper is a fit subject
for apology, which I now offer to the highest tribunal of the territory.12

The t:ights of a municipality to levy special assessments
against property owners came under the reviewing eye of
the Supreme Court in July, 1891. Chief Justice O'Brien,
writing the opinion of the court, decided that where it did
not appear that two-thirds of the owners of the property
charged with the assessment had petitioned that improvements be made, a property owner could appeal his grievance,
'in case such an assessment was levied, to a court in equity
in the district where taxes had been levied. 13
As early as August, 1892, rumors became prevalent
that Judge O'Brien desired to be relieved from his position
as chief justice. His resignation followed shortly afterward
and it became effective early in 1893. Judge O'Brien then
11. _ Tomlinson v. TerritOT1/, 7 N. M. 195, at p. 214.
12. Ibid., at p. 210.
13. Albuquerque v. Zeioer, 5 N. M. 674, 27 Pac. 315.
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returned to Minnesota to resume the practice of law. He
died there in Caledonia on November 5, 1909.
A memorial by the Minnesota State Bar· Association
pays the following tribute to an able jurist:
Judge O'Brien's many friends bear witness that, as a teacher, he
was thorough and energetic; as a writer, fluent and forcible; as a
speaker, pleasing beyond the great majority of even good speakers;
and as a lawyer and judge, he was able and painstaking, honorable
and upright. 14

14, ' Minnesota Bar Association, Proceedings, 1910. Pp. 189-190.

